


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WEEKLY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

State Dept. review completed



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downgrading and declassification

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SECRET**C O N T E N T S**

(Information as of noon EST, 3 February 1966)

	<u>Page</u>
VIETNAM	1
<p>Three large allied operations have so far failed to engage any large main force Communist units, although small unit actions in one operation have resulted in mounting enemy casualties. Elsewhere, the intensity of VC-initiated activity picked up last weekend. Premier Ky plans to reorganize his cabinet and staff for greater efficiency. Ho Chi Minh, in an attack on the US peace initiative, insisted that the National Liberation Front must be recognized as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. Hanoi also quickly denounced both the resumption of US airstrikes and the US effort to bring Vietnam to the UN. Although both Moscow and Peking did likewise, the Chinese were clearly more pleased with Hanoi's show of determination. Four US aircraft were lost in the first two days of renewed strikes in the North. A new airfield is under construction near Yen Bai.</p>	
<u>The Communist World</u>	
SOVIET CONSERVATIVES SEEK REFURBISHING OF STALIN'S IMAGE	5
<p>A recent Pravda article is the latest evidence of a cautious <u>but</u> determined effort to halt public condemnation of Stalin and his era. However, the called-for rewrite of Soviet history is unlikely to convince the USSR's new generation of young intellectuals.</p>	
SOVIET COMMISSION TO REVAMP COLLECTIVE FARM CHARTER	6
<p>By associating virtually the entire party elite with the commission's stated purpose of revising the collective farm charter, party first secretary Brezhnev apparently intends to commit them to the achievement of substantial improvement in agricultural production.</p>	

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SECRET**SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY WEAPONS**

The USSR has developed for its infantry a family of light individual assault weapons combining simplicity of design, reliability, accuracy at common ranges, and high rates of fire. It has also succeeded in standardizing on a single type of short, lightweight cartridge for most of these weapons. Although not providing the long-range power of most Western counterparts, the weapons and cartridge are more effective at the shorter ranges characteristic of modern, mobile infantry warfare.

ALBANIA SEARCHES FOR FRIENDS

The Hoxha regime may be seeking friendlier relations with some Soviet bloc and Western countries, either in the belief this will make lobbying for Communist China more effective or, conversely, as a matter of prudence in case relations with Peking become unpalatable.

Asia-Africa**INTERNAL SECURITY EFFORTS BOOSTED IN SOUTH KOREA**

South Korea is showing renewed interest in its security against actions by the Communist North.

RUMORS OF INDONESIAN "POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" CONTINUE

Civilian anti-Communist leaders are reported fearful that Sukarno plans an imminent and dramatic political reorganization, and that the army's resistance is weakening.

BURMESE INSURGENCY AT A HIGH LEVEL

Various ethnic and Communist insurgent bands are becoming increasingly bold and aggressive in many parts of Burma.

ZAMBIA APPARENTLY DELAYING TRADE BREAK WITH RHODESIA

The arrival of a UK military planning mission and the success of an emergency petroleum supply operation seem to have renewed President Kaunda's confidence in the UK's determination to bring down the rebel Rhodesian regime.

MILITARY REGIME BEGINS RECONSTRUCTION IN NIGERIA

General Ironsi has taken some promising steps toward giving Nigeria more efficient government and is continuing to try to avoid arousing tribal animosities.

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SECRET**ETHIOPIAN ELITE AGAIN VOICING DISCONTENT**

14

The coup in Nigeria stimulated grumbling among Ethiopia's educated elite, but the Emperor appears unready to satisfy their desire for reform.

Europe**ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS CONTINUES**

15

The composition of the new Moro cabinet is likely to prove the major obstacle to an early solution of Italy's government crisis.

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SETTLEMENT OF EEC CRISIS LEAVES ISSUES UNRESOLVED

17

Although De Gaulle appears to have fallen short of obtaining his maximum demands, prospects for resumption of normal functioning do not appear bright. French reservations play havoc with the assumption that integration is irreversible and seem likely to encourage efforts to revive Britain's interest in membership.

DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO

NATO seems to have come through the past year relatively well, weathering but not surmounting two very critical issues: France's threat to withdraw in 1969, and the problem of nuclear sharing. There has been, in fact, a noticeable trend toward coalescence on the part of the other 14 members in standing up to France. On the nuclear issue, most of the members have breathed a collective sigh of relief that the problem of creating a multilateral force is temporarily on ice.

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Western Hemisphere**DOMINICAN CRISIS APPEARS NEAR CLIMAX**

18

The political impasse in the Dominican Republic seems to be nearing a climax, with President Garcia Godoy willing to make extensive concessions in the hope of avoiding a final showdown with the regular military.

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POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA PRESIDENT

19

Although Ovando professes to support former co-president Barrientos' presidential candidacy, he is reportedly working behind the scenes to block it.

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VIETNAM

Three large allied operations in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and the Phuoc Tuy - Bien Hoa border area --employing some 15,000 to 16,000 combat troops--highlighted the military situation this week in South Vietnam. Thus far, the main force Communist units (estimated at seven or eight regiments in all three areas) have attempted to avoid contact. A prisoner taken in Binh Dinh Province indicated that one North Vietnamese unit in the area had split temporarily into small groups to evade allied forces.

Occasional resistance by Communist units of company size has been reported in Binh Dinh Province, however, and enemy casualties there continue to mount. Little fighting has developed from operations in Quang Ngai and the Phuoc Tuy - Bien Hoa area but enemy supplies and other evidence point to the recent presence of Communist forces. Cumulative Viet Cong losses in these operations are reported as 766 killed and 168 captured. Allied casualties are 136 killed (79 US) and 561 wounded (372 US).

A longer term security and rice-harvesting operation in Phu Yen Province, in progress for about two weeks, has also taken a steady toll. To date over 300 Communists have been reported killed. Allied casualties total 35 killed (7 US) and 121 wounded (48 US).

The intensity of Viet Cong - initiated activity picked up last weekend. A government relief force, dispatched to an outpost under attack in Quang Ngai Province, was itself heavily engaged on 28 January. Resulting government losses

totalled 130. Elsewhere, a Viet Cong battalion attacked government forces in Chuong Thien Province, and some ten smaller enemy attacks were also reported in the delta area south of Saigon.

South Vietnam's Political Situation

Premier Ky recently told a US official that he is planning to reorganize his cabinet and personal staff this month. In an effort to deal with major economic problems, he will split the present Ministry of Economy into separate ministries for foreign trade and for internal economic affairs. Four additional appointees to Ky's own staff will deal more efficiently with problems of corruption, refugees, Viet Cong defectors, and port operations. Ky has indicated that he will choose native southerners for these positions to counter charges that his government is overly influenced by native northerners.

Hanoi on US Initiatives

North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh attacked the US peace initiative on 24 January and underscored the importance that North Vietnam attaches to the participation of the Liberation Front in any negotiated settlement. In one of the most straightforward assertions made publicly by a North Vietnamese leader, Ho insisted that the US "recognize the Front as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam and engage in negotiations with it." He also promised to "continue the fight as long as US forces remain in Vietnam." His language implied that these two elements represented

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preconditions to any talks. Ho's letter, addressed specifically to North Vietnam's Communist allies, may also have been intended to provide some amplification of the DRV's terms for negotiations in the hopes of getting more effective support, particularly from European Communist party circles.

In separate Foreign Ministry statements published on 1 February, Hanoi also quickly denounced both the resumption of US air strikes and the US effort to bring the Vietnam problem to the UN. The DRV said that any UN Security Council resolution "which interfered with the Vietnam problem was null and void." The denunciation of the air strikes reinforced Ho's tough talk about troop withdrawal, maintaining that the US "must unconditionally" withdraw its troops and weapons from South Vietnam." The language implies that Hanoi will not be satisfied with any partial US pullout as a prelude to a political settlement.

Peking Propaganda

The Chinese were clearly pleased by Ho's tough letter of 24 January and endorsed it immediately after the Vietnamese made the text public on 28 January.

Peking not only repeated the full text, but added an appendix, not included in the Vietnamese release, containing Phan Van Dong's "four points" of last April. The Chinese probably used this device to emphasize the importance of these demands--reportedly regarded by Chinese leaders as an effective obstacle to any negotiations.

On 30 January, a People's Daily editorial hailed Ho's letter

as new evidence of the "steel-like determination" of the Vietnamese to carry the struggle through to the end. The editorial declared flatly that "there is no room for bargaining" with regard to Hanoi's four-point formula or the status of the Liberation Front. It asserted that the Front "assumes and plays the role of the state organ in South Vietnam," a declaration that moved Peking further toward open endorsement of the Front as a government. It was also a more forthright claim of status for the Front than anything either Hanoi or Front representatives have released in public.

Chairman Liu Shao-chi's reply also stressed Chinese confidence in Hanoi's determination. Liu's pledge that the Chinese people will stand by the Vietnamese in a "joint struggle" no matter what the US may do was a repetition of generalized promises Peking has been making since last fall.

The Chinese responded to resumption of bombing attacks against North Vietnam with renewed attacks on US duplicity, charging that the air strikes were a "reckless" reaction to the failure of the US "peace hoax." A People's Daily editorial on 1 February asserted that the US "is at its wits' end on the Vietnam question and is vainly seeking to get out of its predicament by means of war expansion." On 2 February, Peking reacted to the US proposal that the Vietnam question be put to the UN Security Council by reiterating the Communist position that the UN has "nothing to do" with the Vietnam problem, which could only be settled in accordance with the "spirit" of the Geneva agreements--as interpreted by Hanoi's "four points."

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SECRETMoscow's Support for Hanoi

Soviet President Podgorny's 1 February reply to Ho's letter adhered closely to standard lines, condemning "US aggression" and reaffirming Soviet pledges of political and material support. A 31 January government statement claimed the resumption of US attacks showed that Washington's diplomatic moves are "aimed at misleading world opinion and preparing for further escalation."

TASS promptly reported Hanoi's opposition to UN involvement and in a 1 February speech at the UN, Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko predictably objected to Security Council discussion. Echoing the North Vietnamese statement, Fedorenko criticized the request for UN action as a "diversionary tactic designed to hide plans to expand the war." On 2 February, Pravda denounced the US move as a "farce" perpetrated by those who are really responsible for the war, and who know very well that the "UN has nothing to do with the Vietnamese problem."

DRV Military Developments

US aircraft resumed the attack against North Vietnam on 31 January, hitting the main road network in the southern part of North Vietnam. Targets included bridges, road intersections, rolling stock, barges, and vehicles. Four US aircraft were lost to enemy ground fire during the first two days, bringing the total number of US aircraft lost over North Vietnam to 194.

A new airfield is under construction near Yen Bai. [redacted]

[redacted] the final runway will be approximately 6,600 feet long. When completed, this airfield will probably be jet capable. Aircraft based here would be in a better position to defend the northwestern areas of North Vietnam against US aircraft flying in over Laos from Thailand. [redacted]

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SECRETThe Communist World

SOVIET CONSERVATIVES SEEK REFURBISHING OF STALIN'S IMAGE

A cautious but determined effort to halt the public condemnation of Stalin and his era has been in evidence in the Soviet Union since last March. Another step in this process was taken by Pravda last week in an article on Soviet historiography signed by Yevgeny Zhukov, leading historian of the Academy of Sciences, and two of his colleagues. The article calls for a new version of Soviet history that will emphasize the "enormous successes" achieved by the regime in the half century since the revolution, playing down the cost in human suffering.

The authors make it plain that the purpose is not to achieve "objective" history as this term is understood in the West, but rather a history that will help the party mold an obedient population.

The article calls for less discussion of what went wrong under Stalin and attacks "certain" colleagues for having paid tribute in the recent past to "unprincipled opportunism"--an apparent reference to Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization as a political weapon to beat back opposition to his policies. By discussing--however obliquely--both Khrushchev and Stalin for the first time in the same article, Pravda

raises the possibility that Soviet historians will tend to polarize around the opposing symbols of these two leaders.

The top leaders now in the Kremlin have yet to comment publicly on how Stalin and his era should be viewed. The official historians who wrote the Pravda article, however, are the latest addition to a growing chorus of low-level party secretaries, Komsomol leaders, ranking military officers, and ideological and cultural officials who demand the public discussion of unpleasant aspects of the Soviet past and present be halted on the ground that it breeds cynicism in the younger generation.

The difficulty with the approach being followed by these guardians of the party's image arises from the fact that a higher level of education is required of the new generation. Today's young intellectuals, who refer contemptuously to conformists as "ideological comrades" and "patriots," are unlikely to be convinced by oversimplified histories and suppression of criticism. Therefore, even though the conservative forces have become more vocal in the past year, their proposed solution appears to hold little promise of success.

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SECRET**SOVIET COMMISSION TO REVAMP COLLECTIVE FARM CHARTER**

A 149-man commission has been formed under the chairmanship of party first secretary Brezhnev to draft a new statute for the USSR's 38,000 collective farms (kolkhozes).

The commission not only includes all 24 members of the party presidium and secretariat, but regional party secretaries and top agriculture officials as well. Brezhnev apparently intends by this move to associate virtually the entire party elite with revision of the collective farm charter, thereby committing them to the achievement of substantial improvements in agricultural production.

The need for revising the existing collective farm "model charter"--actually a set of statutes issued in 1935 with the force of law--has long been recognized. Khrushchev called the statutes obsolete. He talked much of the need for revising them and of convening a new collective farm congress to do so, but repeatedly postponed the matter.

Brezhnev and his cohorts are clearly prepared to substitute action for words, and to institute some reforms while at the same time keeping the basic collective farm system intact. At the central committee plenum on agriculture last March, Brezhnev said the statutes would be revised, and to this end announced that an All-Union Collective Farm Congress, the third in Soviet history, would be convened some time this year.

The new charter will probably incorporate a number of

changes already being proposed to make the collective farm a more viable economic entity. Certain steps have already been taken in recent years to raise collective farm incomes, but if the hostility of collective members toward the kolkhoz organization is to be overcome, some method of distributing income will have to be devised that guarantees the individual farmer a fair return for his labor. A system of guaranteed wages plus bonuses seems likely to be adopted.

Many other suggestions have been advanced to promote a sense of personal commitment and responsibility. The new leadership has given evidence by its industrial reform that it recognizes the need to promote local initiative and is prepared, within limits, to do something about it. Under the existing system, the collective farms have almost no power to make independent decisions, and some improvements may be attempted in this respect. The new regime has already reversed Khrushchev's policy of further restricting private plots, and additional steps to provide support for the private sector may be taken.

The announcement of the commission's existence included the notation that local bodies have been drafting suggestions for consideration, further evidence that the regime intends to carry through with the agricultural program announced by Brezhnev last March. Since that time, he has made it quite clear that in spite of problems and critics, the program continues to be regarded as a priority policy of the party and government.

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ALBANIA SEARCHES FOR FRIENDS

Albania's leadership may be ending its self-imposed isolation by seeking friendlier relations with some Soviet bloc and Western countries. The Hoxha regime may believe that this will make it more effective as a lobbyist in behalf of its ally and benefactor, Communist China. On the other hand, the regime also may believe it prudent to establish broader ties in case relations with Peking become unpalatable.

Since its break with Moscow in 1961, Tirana has relied almost solely on Peking to sustain Albania's industrialization program and for political support. This led to strained relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and increased Albania's isolation from the West.

In recent months, however, Albania seems to have shown willingness to improve relations with selected Communist countries. Tirana has, for example, responded positively to several Rumanian gestures of friendship. In addition, the recent renewal of ambassadorial-level contact with Poland may signal closer relations with that country. Albania had always left the door open for such an action, having never permanently pulled its ambassador out of Warsaw.

Albania has also turned a friendlier face toward the West. In a recent interview with a Turkish journalist, Albanian Foreign Minister Shtylla stated

there were no problems in Turkish-Albanian relations and, noting that different political systems should not prevent them from being friends, urged conclusion of cultural and trade agreements.

A French-Albanian cultural program has included an exchange of professors and the establishment of a French chair at the University of Tirana. Italy and Albania signed a cultural accord last March, and there are plans to establish an Albanian commercial office in Italian Trieste. Austria and Albania plan an increase in the exchange of goods for 1966.

Albania still maintains complete solidarity with Peking and there have been no indications that a deterioration of relations is imminent. There have been rumors, however, that Albania has not been entirely satisfied with the amount and quality of aid received from Peking.

The protracted Sino-Albanian negotiations last fall on credits for Tirana's economic plan (1966-70) suggested that the Chinese might have been reluctant to meet Albania's requests fully. Unprecedentedly, the Albanian parliament, when it met in late December, debated but did not approve either the 1966 national budget or the new five-year plan. Neither is yet approved. The parliament's delay may be due to incomplete negotiations with Peking.

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Asia-Africa

INTERNAL SECURITY EFFORTS BOOSTED IN SOUTH KOREA

South Korea is showing renewed interest in its security against actions by the Communist North.

Recent Communist activity appears to have been adapted to meet the new situation resulting from the normalization of Japanese - South Korean relations and the deployment of Korean troops to South Vietnam. There has been no startling increase in infiltrations from the North--170 agents were apprehended in 1965--but there have been significant changes in agent personnel and in their missions.

The chances for genuine guerrilla activity appear slim. Only small amounts of arms and ammunition have been uncovered, and the South Korean people continue their deep-seated opposition to Communism.

Korean authorities do not want to be caught napping, however. They reportedly plan to reinforce the blockade of coastal and land penetration routes, intensify operational measures against agents, and establish village-level organizations to foster cooperation among the military, the government, and the people. They also intend to take measures to stem agent infiltration from Japan and to lighten up the Citizen's Registration Law. The police plan to organize a Special Counter-Guerrilla Fighting Force and have been promised a 7,000-man increase over their present total of nearly 34,000.

The major drawback to effective internal security up to now has been lack of coordination among the concerned agencies. At one time, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)--then headed by present Democratic Republican Party

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chairman Kim Chong-pil--super-
seded all other services. With
the new emphasis on coordination,
however, the CIA has inaugurated
an Armed Forces Situation Room
where intelligence representa-
tives of all services and the
police monitor the activities of
suspected North Korean agents
around the clock.



RUMORS OF INDONESIAN "POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" CONTINUE

Rumors are continuing to
circulate in Djakarta regarding
President Sukarno's long-awaited
"political settlement."

Some civilian anti-Communist
leaders are expressing alarm
over what they consider to be
Sukarno's growing strength and
the erosion of the army's will
to resist. They fear that Su-
karno now is planning an immi-
nent and dramatic political re-
organization that would in large
part restore his former author-
ity, undermine anti-Communist
elements, and pave the way for
an eventual restoration of Com-
munist influence in Indonesia.

Sukarno, however, has been
delaying any such direct move,
apparently in the belief that
his position can best be restored
by a more gradual approach and
the passage of time. Aware that
the future role of Indonesian
Communism is the one issue on
which the army has been willing
to oppose him directly, Sukarno
has recently been ignoring the
subject. This strategy has in-
deed strengthened his position
during the past month, and it
seems unlikely that he wishes
to risk a direct confrontation
with the army now.


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BURMESE INSURGENCY AT A HIGH LEVEL

Various ethnic and Communist insurgent bands are becoming increasingly bold and aggressive in many parts of Burma.

Although insurgency--endemic in Burma since World War II --normally mounts at the end of the southwest monsoon season in October, an unusually high level of activity appears to have developed over the past three months. Rebels are impeding the government's inept commodity distribution efforts, causing uncertainty among farmers both by intimidation and by spreading rumors about the government, and are attacking transportation and communications arteries.

In late December, Communist-dominated National Democratic United Front rebels raided a railway station and police post about 40 miles north of Pegu on the Rangoon-Mandalay railway. In one of the more recent incidents, unidentified insurgents reportedly seized two armories,

one of which was at a police station in Rangoon.

Active ethnic insurgents include some 4,500 Karens, 4,500 Kachins, and possibly 5,000 Shans. The most serious threat, however, is posed by some 1,000 hard-core activists of the Burma Communist Party, known as the White Flags and having links with Peking.

General Ne Win's efforts to cope with insurgency reportedly are being hampered by desertions and defections among government forces. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] an entire light-infantry battalion stationed near Rangoon, one of the army's elite units, deserted in late November after being ordered into operation against Communist insurgents near Pegu. The Ne Win regime is not currently endangered, however, mainly because of the insurgents' lack of unity and inability to muster any appreciable popular support. [REDACTED]

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SECRET**ZAMBIA APPARENTLY DELAYING TRADE BREAK WITH RHODESIA**

The Zambian Government is apparently no longer insisting on immediate participation in a total economic blockade of Rhodesia. This change in attitude came after the arrival of a UK military planning mission and the success of the emergency petroleum transport operation in delivering enough supplies to satisfy Zambia's normal needs.

These developments apparently renewed Zambian confidence in the UK's determination to bring down the rebel Rhodesian regime. Zambian President Kaunda now appears willing to delay the threatened trade break with Rhodesia beyond the 15 February deadline he reportedly agreed upon with Prime Minister Wilson. [REDACTED]

should Rhodesian imports be stopped, adequate transport facilities to fill Zambia's minimum requirements would not be available at least until mid-April.

Zambia's decision as to the type and timing of its sanc-

tions against Rhodesia depends on its continued faith in UK policy. Should the oil embargo be broken or Rhodesian tobacco and other goods find an outlet, a rapid reversal in Zambian policy could occur.

Further complicating the Zambian situation is a demand by white workers in the vital copper mines for large increases in pay and allowances. The Zambian Government is publicly committed to developing a single wage scale for all mine workers regardless of race, and probably will be unwilling to increase the disparity of wages between Africans and whites. The Europeans in Zambia, however, already worried about their future if relations between Rhodesia and Zambia deteriorate further, are remaining in the country only because of the high wages. It would take very little additional tension to persuade much of Zambia's skilled white labor force to leave the country. [REDACTED]

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SECRET**MILITARY REGIME BEGINS RECONSTRUCTION IN NIGERIA**

General Ironsi's military regime has taken some promising first steps toward the more efficient governing of Nigeria. However, an early breakdown of discipline in the army could still occur.

Last week, regional military governors issued decrees designed to restore effective local government and to eradicate corruption. There appears to have been some coordination and central guidance in the drawing up of these decrees, but the military governors also seem to have some latitude in how they govern their respective regions. The efficiency with which the various regions will operate probably depends in large part on the ability of the individual governors. At this time, Eastern Region Governor Ojukwu stands out as the most forceful personality among the key leaders.

In an effort to increase efficiency and cut the cost of government, General Ironsi has reduced the number of ministries and reallocated the functions of some of them. He has appointed some new permanent secretaries to the ministries and transferred others, presumably in an attempt to increase his control over the civil service. In a further structuring of his regime, Ironsi also reportedly plans to set up both a national secretariat to coordinate the work of the regions and an executive secretariat to act as an arm of the central military government.

The regime apparently intends to develop a governmental

The regime apparently intends to develop a governmental system with a stronger central authority than Nigeria has known since independence in 1960.

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the present four semiautonomous regions will be supplanted by a larger number of provinces responsible to Lagos under a unitary, rather than federal, structure. Although such an arrangement is likely to be resisted by older, traditional leaders, it appears that it would be welcomed by a great many Nigerians. However, in the key Northern Region, even the new leaders who have emerged reportedly oppose splitting up their region unless the Eastern and Western regions are similarly divided.

Ironsi, a member of the Ibo tribe as are most of the younger officers who spearheaded the 15 January coup, seems to be trying to counter the impression in some quarters that the new regime will be dominated by Ibos. Most of the leading permanent secretaries appear to have been chosen because of administrative ability rather than tribal allegiance. However, there has been some indication of tribal conflict in the upper levels of the civil service.

Tribal considerations are also evidently involved in the continuing signs of dissidence within the army. Another reported cause is dissatisfaction on the part of the still restless younger officers over the apparent detention of several of the original coup leaders.

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SECRET**ETHIOPIAN ELITE AGAIN VOICING DISCONTENT**

There are new rumblings of discontent among Ethiopia's young educated elite--particularly in the military--in the wake of the military takeover in Nigeria. The 73-year-old Emperor Haile Selassie appears to be aware of the rumblings, but instead of moving toward needed reforms he is resorting to his traditional tactic of merely fending off his critics.

Less than two weeks after the Nigerian coup, top Ethiopian military leaders said they were worried about dissatisfaction among younger officers and civilians. They stressed again that the Emperor must make reforms to save himself and to prevent Ethiopia from becoming the scene of a similar political and military upheaval. They gave no specific evidence of plotting, but suggested that the young educated elite had reached a new high of frustration and restlessness.

The wily Emperor has so far been able to survive coup attempts and to intimidate his opponents, play them off one against the other, and prevent the formation of organized opposition. Over the past months, however, the facade of constitutional government and the fact of absolute personal rule have spurred increasingly widespread

and open criticism of the once-sacred Emperor.

The Emperor had already been under fire for his failure to break diplomatic relations with the UK over the Rhodesia problem. Now the coup in Nigeria is widely discussed in military and political circles, and many believe the situation in Ethiopia is much more fragile than it was in Nigeria when that coup occurred.

These half-measures may stave off an explosion as they have in the past. However, the time left to the aging Emperor for such stalling tactics is dwindling, and his once firm control over the government appears to be loosening.

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ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS CONTINUES

The composition of the new Moro cabinet is likely to prove the major obstacle to an early solution of Italy's government crisis.

Christian Democratic (CD) leaders were able last week to paper over their differences sufficiently to reach unanimous agreement on a political document pledging full party support for the center-left program. The meeting made clear, however, that both former foreign minister Fanfani and CD right-winger Mario Scelba will seek representation for their factions in the new cabinet.

While Fanfani's wishes are still not clear, his call for "cabinet changes sufficient to guarantee the program" confirms his intention to press for several ministerial posts. In Scelba's case, the US Embassy suspects his support of the CD document was a maneuver to win a place for his faction in the new government.

An attempt to placate the Scelba faction with a minor ministry, however, is likely to be opposed by the CD left wing and could raise new demands by the other coalition partners. To offset the inclusion of the Scelba faction, according to a Social Democratic (PSDI) official, the PSDI and the Socialists (PSI) plan to ask Moro for two of the five key "political" ministries now held by his party. The foreign affairs and public instruction posts are considered the most negotiable.

[REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] With PSDI leader Saragat as president, however, the CDs will be extremely reluctant to negotiate on any key posts. Further difficult bargaining appears to lie ahead as Moro maneuvers to placate both his own party's factions and his coalition partners. [REDACTED] 25X1
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SETTLEMENT OF EEC CRISIS LEAVES ISSUES UNRESOLVED

The EEC Council reached agreements in Luxembourg on 28-29 January which will evidently end France's seven-month boycott, but the political issues that caused the crisis appear basically unresolved.

Proposals which have been tentatively accepted for "improving Council-Commission cooperation" are much weaker than the original French demands. Several of Paris' "ten points" were dropped, others were recast in language proposed by the Five, and the Commission's right to initiate proposals was preserved. Furthermore, in contrast to the initial French demands, which were cast in terms of a directive to the Commission, the proposed new rules are subject to further negotiation between the Council and the Commission.

The French attempt to set new deadlines for agricultural financing and merger of the community executives was rejected. Although agreement was reached to hold an early Council meeting, the Kennedy Round and other issues of interest to the Five will be discussed along with agricultural financing.

It is the intention of the Five not to deposit ratifications of the treaty to merge the executives until the new Commission's membership is agreed on. Since the Five generally recognize that by gaining approval for "weak" personnel Paris could inhibit the executive even more than by formal restraints, the bargaining is likely to be hard.

On majority voting, the formula adopted after bitter debate merely records the differences between France and the Five. The Five refused to recognize a member country's continued right to a veto in "vital" decisions, but allowed France to register its position that discussion of issues involving "very important interests" must go on until unanimous agreement is reached.

The first test on the voting issue may come in the Council discussions on a revised negotiating mandate for the Kennedy Round. Some confusion exists on the extent to which majority rule will apply here, since the French may demand a quid pro quo for agreeing with the Germans that unanimous voting continue to govern agricultural decisions pending at the end of 1965.

Although De Gaulle appears to have fallen considerably short of obtaining his maximum demands, prospects for the community's resuming its normal functioning do not appear especially bright. De Gaulle's threats and the lengthy crisis have taken their toll on the "community spirit," and his reservation of "freedom of action" plays havoc with the vital assumption that the integrative process is irreversible. In these circumstances, the Dutch and the Germans in particular seem likely to continue their efforts to revive Britain's interest in membership. 25X1

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SECRETWestern Hemisphere**DOMINICAN CRISIS APPEARS NEAR CLIMAX**

The political impasse in the Dominican Republic seems to be nearing a climax, with President Garcia Godoy willing to make extensive concessions in the hope of avoiding a final showdown with the regular military.

The Dominican military--from Minister of Defense Francisco Rivera Caminero to the officer corps--seem determined not to accept the President's 6 January re-assignment order without further bargaining. On 31 January, Garcia Godoy met with 60 top military officers. The President was bluntly and repeatedly told that only the regular military, with its morale and integrity unscathed, can provide for internal security and prevent the world-wide success of Communism.

This meeting, in which Garcia Godoy hoped to both sound out the military and convince them of his desire to prevent the weakening of the armed forces, apparently convinced him that his original order would not be obeyed. In addition, Garcia Godoy seems to be fearful--with some reason--that the supporters of the former "constitutional" cause, led by Juan Bosch and his Dominican Revolutionary Party, might instigate strikes or violence to force the removal of the chiefs.

In order to forestall a final break with the military, and to maintain a modicum of his support in the former rebel camp, Garcia

Godoy appears willing to modify his original proposal in important aspects. The prime consideration is that Rivera must resign, since Garcia Godoy is well aware the leftists would not be satisfied otherwise. Garcia Godoy appears willing, however, to permit Rivera and the other chiefs to name their own replacements, and he might even be willing to let the other chiefs retain their positions. The President is prepared to offer guarantees, backed up by the OAS, that no further changes will be made in the military leadership before elections.

The military reaction is uncertain. If the proposal is only that Rivera must go, he could hardly maintain his stance that the military's morale and integrity would be seriously affected, especially since both the leading candidates for his position--navy chief Emilio Jimenez and army Colonel Enrique Perez y Perez--are competent military officers who have the respect of their subordinates. Rivera could easily be accused, with some cause, of refusing solely on personal grounds. On the other hand, the military chiefs have increasingly lost respect for Garcia Godoy's word, and they and Rivera might feel that the President's guarantee of no further changes would be worthless.

It is also highly possible that reaction from the former rebel camp would be negative. Although Rivera now is the rebels' bete noire, both the army and air force

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chiefs are held in low esteem by the leftists and anything less than their replacement would probably be considered a sell-out. Bosch and other elements might well carry through on their threats to force the issue by calling a general strike. Caamano could use the military's recalcitrance as a rationale for returning from his London attaché post.

Garcia Godoy may decide, therefore, that only the forcible removal of the military chiefs will permit him to maintain his office and prestige. He now appears willing to use the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to effect their departure, as was done with General Wessin y Wessin in September.

The OAS Committee has gone on record as supporting the President and would authorize the IAPF to remove the chiefs. However, it is questionable that some of the Latin American contingents, specifically the large Brazilian force, would obey such an order.

Brazilian General Braga, commander of the IAPF, would probably have the most influence on whether Latin American governments would authorize their personnel in the IAPF to take such action. Braga's reluctance leaves open the possibility that US forces would have 25X1 the primary responsibility of enforcing the Dominican Government's decision.

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POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA PRESIDENT

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[redacted] Junta president General Alfredo Ovando Candia has been working behind the scenes to block his former co-president, General Rene Barrientos, from winning the presidency in the 3 July elections. Barrientos, in Europe since early January, is scheduled to return to La Paz on 4 or 5 February after a short visit in Washington.

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[redacted]
Although they have no real plan as yet for canceling elections or preventing Barrientos from running, they are said to be promoting the concept of calling a constituent assembly as a political alternative to elections.

Although professing to support Barrientos' candidacy, Ovando has undercut him in the past and would probably like to destroy him politically if this can be done safely. A possible move toward such a goal occurred last week when the commander of the crack para-troop regiment in Cochabamba--a staunch Barrientos supporter--was replaced by an officer loyal to Ovando.

[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] there is no indication that the military would support the use of force to prevent Barrientos from assuming power through elections. Therefore, Ovando will 25X1 probably continue his attempts to undercut Barrientos without pushing for a direct showdown.

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
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4 February 1966

OCI No. 0275/66A

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SPECIAL REPORT

DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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downgrading and declassification

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SECRET**DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization seems to have come through the past year relatively well, weathering but not surmounting two very critical issues: France's threat to withdraw in 1969, and the problem of nuclear sharing. There has, in fact, been a noticeable trend toward a coalescence on the part of the other 14 members in standing up to France. On the nuclear issue, most of the members have breathed a collective sigh of relief that the problem of creating a multilateral force is temporarily on ice while the Special Committee pursues the possibilities of nuclear consultation.

France and NATO

The narrowness of De Gaulle's victory at the polls in December is not expected to alter his opposition to NATO's integrated force structure and to the NATO-related US military presence in France. Although De Gaulle has not specified the kind of relationship he wants to replace the present NATO setup, he appears to favor loose bilateral defense arrangements and a continuation of the principal Allied rights in West Germany.

It is apparent that De Gaulle intends if possible to move against NATO this year. Although his precise timing may be affected by the course of the crisis in the Common Market, French officials have said that the first clear and specific moves can probably be expected early in the spring.

Most officials believe these moves will be aimed initially at US bilateral status-of-forces agreements with France. They are

expected to involve the laying down of conditions for the continued presence in France of US bases. The US has made clear that it considers these agreements of interest to all members of the alliance and will not be satisfied with strictly bilateral discussion if French demands would affect the ability of the US to perform NATO missions assigned to its forces in Europe.

Subsequent French moves could mean the ultimate removal of NATO's military headquarters (SHAPE) from France and its relocation probably somewhere in the low countries, with NATO retaining little more in France than the right to use and pass through French territory during wartime. It might also be necessary at some time to move the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with its staffs and secretariat from Paris, possibly to London or Brussels.

In the absence of more precise announcements of French

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intentions, the other allies are able only to brace themselves for a crisis of unknown scale.

Allied Nuclear Sharing

The limitation of the Erhard talks in Washington on 20-21 December to general principles of nuclear sharing rather than specifics is in keeping with the Alliance consensus that this problem should be dealt with in a way that would not weaken the alliance in the forthcoming showdown with France.

Although the communiqué issued after the meeting recognized West Germany's right to an appropriate share in "nuclear defense" with its allies, no decisions or agreements were reached. For the time being at least, the Germans are apparently content to examine their nuclear concerns with "other interested allies." Moreover, though Bonn continues to reiterate that consultation is not enough, Erhard did affirm in Washington the usefulness of the NATO Special Committee, which in late November had set up working groups to study NATO's nuclear arrangements and how to improve them.

Inasmuch as the Special Committee was established to find a generally acceptable solution for the nuclear problem, with or without French participation, the successful launching of activities has helped give NATO renewed vitality. The Special Committee's working groups are beginning work on three problems: the sharing of essential intelligence among alliance members,

improvement of communications procedures to allow prompt decisions to use nuclear weapons, and extending of allied participation in alliance nuclear planning. The three groups are to submit their first reports to the next meeting of the Special Committee in the spring.

Only three members--Luxembourg, Portugal, and Iceland--have expressed no interest at all in the committee and its activities. Norway, while interested, decided to defer a decision on whether to join. Any skepticism among those participating in the committee is probably due to the feeling that the outcome of its labors will depend in the last analysis on what the US puts into it. Some are more enthusiastic because they consider the consultative approach to nuclear sharing greatly preferable to West German participation in any "hardware" solution.

Although West Germany has scheduled bilateral talks later this spring with the US and UK, and probably other interested countries, any early agreement on a concentrated effort to devise a generally acceptable "hardware" scheme is unlikely. The ideas Bonn recently advanced for a jointly owned nuclear submarine force show some similarity to the old scheme for an Atlantic nuclear force put forth by the UK, but it remains doubtful that the differences between these two principals could easily be negotiated away--even if the other allies were reconciled to accepting a German role in such a force.

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For the time being, therefore, it appears likely there will be no great pressure within NATO to go beyond the Special Committee approach to the nuclear question. France, of course, is expected to continue its campaign to terminate the committee--probably when it reports to the ministers in June--because De Gaulle opposes both any nuclear role for Bonn and any strengthening of the NATO structure.

Reactions to French Position

France's 14 allies, noting De Gaulle's increasingly outspoken rejection of NATO fundamentals, appear to have tacitly accepted the possibility that they may have to move ahead without France on vital issues. Prior to last September, only the UK and the US had begun to think in terms of contingency planning to safeguard NATO's military capabilities against a possible French defection. Since that time, when De Gaulle harshly criticized NATO at one of his periodic press conferences, other members--among them Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands--have also begun to talk about alternate plans. All members continue reluctant to visualize a NATO without France, but there is a better understanding of the US position that NATO's integrated command structure is indispensable to any credible Western defense posture. Moreover, the decision of the US and other key allies not to confront France, but to get on with consolidating the alliance, has had a sympathetic response.

Signs of the growing readiness of the "fourteen" to hold to-

gether against France were evident at last December's ministerial gathering. There, France challenged the standing of the Special Committee, urging its "temporary" character, and suggested it be terminated in June after rendering its report. The other members--led by the US, UK, West Germany, and Secretary General Brosio--lined up solidly against the French and secured the omission from the final communiqué of any reference to the committee as "temporary."

Another example of the growing impatience with Paris was the response to French objections to German requests that the communiqué formally reject Soviet charges of "revanchism" and nuclear ambitions against Germany. With the US in the lead, the other allies closed ranks in support of the Germans; even the Norwegians--who are notably sensitive on the question of German nuclear aspirations--deserted the French. Although the incident involved "only words," Ambassador Cleveland believes it noteworthy for the way the allies reacted to French pressure.

Some Progress in Other Fields

In addition to the work of the Special Committee, the alliance has been able in recent months to show progress in several aspects of its development, despite the problems with France. At the December meeting, for example, the ministers accepted the more modest of two sets of 1970 force goals submitted last year by the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR). The alliance's Defense Planning Committee will

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use these goals as a basis for an effort to match national capabilities and proposed national force plans. Of equal importance was agreement by the ministers to put NATO's regular annual review on a five-year "rolling" basis starting in January 1967. Such a planning cycle carries a clear implication that integrated NATO forces will still be around after 1970.

The French, surprisingly, did not choose to make an issue of this innovation--which will involve a more intimate consultation on national resources and budgets than ever before. They even accepted reference in the communiqué to 1970 force goals. The French defense minister has nevertheless made clear that France will under no circumstance increase its current force commitments to the alliance, and Paris of course can resume its opposition to the force planning exercise at any stage.

The ministers also agreed to ask the North Atlantic Council to study a US proposal for concentrating a greater effort on SACEUR's mobile force. Composed now of six army battalions and six air squadrons from six countries, the force has been increasingly recognized not only for its usefulness as a "fire brigade" with which to respond to threats all along NATO's defense perimeter, but also as an important symbol of the NATO integrated system. Over the past several years, however, efforts to establish it on a firmer footing have been thwarted by a French refusal to share exercise costs of several headquarters

units of the force. The presumption is that in agreeing to expand and regularize the force, the other 14 members will have to pick up the French share.

Infrastructure and Military
Budget Cost Sharing

At a special meeting on 20 and 21 January, NATO's 15 members resolved long-standing differences over provision of funds for the alliance's infrastructure program and military headquarters budget.

Last spring the US--which for years provided almost one third of the annual infrastructure program funds--asked that its share be reduced to 25 percent in 1965 and to 20 percent in later years. No agreement was reached at that time, principally because of UK and West German objections, with the result that the whole program fell a year behind schedule. By fall, financial problems in the British defense program led the UK to seek a reduction in its share of the infrastructure and military headquarters budget.

All the major contenders at the recent special meeting--the US, UK, and West Germany--made some concessions. Even the French proved helpful throughout, accepting increased shares of the costs for both the infrastructure and the military budgets

The US accepted a slight increase in its contribution to

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the military budget, which runs about \$75 million a year, in exchange for a reduction in infrastructure from 30.85 percent to 25.77 percent for 1965 and future programs through 1969. In accepting significantly larger shares of programs that interest them directly, the other NATO countries not only gave practical recognition to the heavy world-wide defense burdens of the US but also reaffirmed their fundamental interest in the alliance.

The Southeast Flank:
Cyprus and Malta

In the category of nagging problems for which no easy solution is in sight are the impact of the Cyprus dispute on Greece and Turkey, and the difficulties that have emerged with Malta's independence. So long as their dispute over Cyprus is not settled, effective cooperation on defense between Greece and Turkey is impossible. Both countries have permitted their differences to bring into question the value of their NATO ties. Both are net recipients of military and other NATO aid. It is growing increasingly difficult, however, to find such assistance from the allies, none of which relishes the prospect that its aid might be used by one against the other.

The question of Malta involves political and economic, as well as military, considerations. As a British possession, the Maltese Islands fell within the NATO defense zone, but lost that status when they became independent in October

1964. The new government's subsequent overtures for full NATO membership were discouraged by the present members, even though the islands are rated as strategically important and have been the site of HAFMED, NATO's top Mediterranean headquarters.

So far, it has been impossible to work out a new NATO-Maltese association beyond the statement of the Maltese Government last fall that it would for the time being respect its previous commitments regarding NATO installations, and a statement by the North Atlantic Council that the alliance members intend to safeguard Malta's independence and territorial integrity.

Meanwhile, the question has been complicated by proposals to move HAFMED to Naples, and by London's apparent intention to cut back its military presence on Malta. Malta is economically heavily dependent on the military forces and installations on its territory. Such a blow would probably greatly benefit the neutralist-minded leader of the opposition party, Dom Mintoff, in the national elections to be held this year.

Conclusions and Outlook

The current balance sheet for the alliance on the big issues is somewhat more positive today than it was a year ago but this unfortunately tells us little about how it may look a year from now. The current easing off of the nuclear sharing question does not necessarily mean that a solution has been found

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in the Special Committee formula--only that some of the other solutions that have been proposed have been found impossible to negotiate at the present time. Over the longer term there will almost surely have to be some reckoning on West Germany's aspirations for nuclear parity with France and Britain, and some redressing of the nuclear preponderance of the US vis-a-vis the European allies.

As far as a showdown with De Gaulle is concerned, the gathering resistance to his views is a hopeful sign, but it cannot yet be said that a determined and viable defense against his attacks has been devised. The current opposition is attributable at least in part to the immoderation of the views he has recently expressed. Ironically, a softer statement by De Gaulle--with no real change in his basic objective--would be far more difficult to withstand. Moreover, it must be expected that at least some of the European coun-

tries will in the end prove unwilling to face up to the actual psychological and political costs of a failure to reach an accommodation with France.

Finally, the conflict in Vietnam is casting an ever deeper shadow over the alliance. US statements at the December ministerial meeting seemed to evoke a greater acceptance of the view that Western security is indivisible. It would be risky, however, to expect any overwhelming response by way of effective aid or even a major change in the attitude of the Europeans toward the Asian conflict: (1) that it is capable of involving them in fighting that seems remote from European defense requirements, (2) that it diverts the energies and attention of the US from its proper role of leadership in the Alliance, and (3) that it prevents the East-West detente that would lessen Europe's defense burden.

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Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT 4 Feb 66

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
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4 February 1966

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SPECIAL REPORT

SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY WEAPONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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SECRET**SOVIET INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY WEAPONS**

According to Soviet tactical doctrine, the mission of the infantry in nuclear or in conventional war is to move in on and destroy the enemy with superior maneuver and firepower. To provide the infantry with the firepower required for this mission, Soviet arms designers and industry have developed a family of light individual assault weapons combining simplicity of design, reliability, accuracy at common combat ranges, and high rates of fire. More significantly, the Soviets have succeeded in standardizing on a single type of short, lightweight cartridge for most of these weapons. Although the weapons and the cartridge do not provide the long-range power of most Western counterparts, they are more effective at the shorter ranges characteristic of modern, mobile infantry warfare.

The Tsarist Heritage

The best rifle in the Soviet arsenal at the beginning of World War II, the Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle, was a hold-over from the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894). A rifle of this basic 1891 design is still available in the Soviet rifle company for sniping purposes. Versions of this sturdy rifle are apparently still manufactured in other Communist countries, including Communist China. Its bullet can penetrate a quarter inch of steel at 600 yards, and a four-power telescope enables the sniper to hit targets at 800 yards or more.

Long before World War II, however, the Soviets recognized the need for increasing the firepower of the infantry squad and the rate of fire of the individual infantryman.

"Hand Machine Guns"

To increase sharply the firepower of small units in World War II, Soviet designers such as Degtyarev, Shpagin, and Sudayev designed "hand machine guns" (submachine guns) for the individual infantryman. These weapons, the PPSH and PPS, fire a short, lightweight pistol cartridge at an effective combat rate of 100 rounds per minute and were produced and issued in great quantity to Soviet rifle units. In recent years, these submachine guns have also been manufactured in Eastern Europe, Communist China, and North Korea.

Chinese versions of the Shpagin submachine gun, called K-50, and the Sudayev model are currently used by the North Vietnamese Army and by Viet Cong main force units.

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The Postwar Generation

Around 1949 the Soviets introduced a new family of small arms with a chrome-plated bore, including the SKS carbine designed by Simonov, the RPD light machine gun designed by Degtyarev, and the AK assault rifle designed by Kalashnikov. All three use a rimless cartridge (M-1943), shorter and lighter than either the Mosin-Nagant cartridge (or the .30-caliber US rifle round) but still effective at twice the range of the submachine guns. Of these, the SKS is becoming obsolete in Communist armies because it is fed by only a 10-round clip and has a relatively crude rear sight. It is still used, however, in militia forces. The other two weapons have proven extremely effective.

The AK

The AK has become the standard Soviet and East European infantryman's weapon. It is also used by Asian Communist forces, including the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Both the weapon and its cartridge are modeled on the World War II German "Sturmgewehr" (assault rifle MP-44) which was designed to fulfill the roles of both the submachine gun and semiautomatic rifle. The Soviets have improved the German model by chrome plating the bore, by refining the rear sight, and by paring off up to two pounds of weight in one version--the AKM.

Elsewhere in the bloc the Czechs have modeled their most

recent assault rifle, the M58, after the Soviet AK. In 1965 the Hungarians introduced their own version, characterized by an extra pistol grip, and reportedly fitted for an infrared sight. AK models are also produced in East Germany, China, North Korea, and Finland.

Light Machine Guns

To increase the firepower of their units below company level, the Soviets in 1949 introduced the RPD light machine gun, fed by a 100-round belt in a drum. This weapon was standard in the Soviet Army until 1961. It also is used by other Communist forces including the Viet Cong. Although it is an excellent ambush weapon because of its practical rate of fire of 150 rounds per minute, it cannot fire single rounds. Moreover, it lacks the quick-change-barrel feature of the US M-60, so the weapon must be allowed to cool after a few minutes of fire.

Since 1961 in the Soviet Army, and since 1964 in some East European ground forces, infantrymen have been issued large numbers of the Kalashnikov light machine gun (RPK). The RPK is a marriage of an improved version of the AK assault rifle--the AKM--with the stock, barrel, and bipod of the RPD. The RPK can fire semiautomatically like the AKM, automatically like the RPD, or at a "slow automatic" rate to conserve ammunition. The magazines for the RPK and AKM are interchangeable, greatly simplifying problems of production,

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training, and logistics. So far only the USSR is known to manufacture the RPK.

New Nonstandard Weapon

As a departure from the trend toward weapons standardization in the bloc, the Czechs have begun issuing a new machine-pistol, called the "Skorpion," to certain specialized units such as border troops. The Skorpion fires Czech pistol ammunition, not Soviet ammunition, and is fed by only 10- and 20-round magazines. The weapon is likely to be used only as a side arm rather than as an assault weapon.

Outlook

For the rest of the 1960s, Soviet and other Communist infantrymen will rely heavily on the combination machine gun/rifle found in the AK. This apparently stems from a conviction, expressed by a writer in the January 1965 issue of the Soviet Military Review, that a short burst of bullets is more effective and accurate than single-shot firing "under conditions of limited visibility commonly encountered in modern combat."

Minor improvements in the AK and RPK weapons will be made,

probably including a greater use of milled and plastic parts, to reduce the number and weight of components. Infrared sights will probably be used more frequently in night operations. Light machine guns may be equipped with a quick-change barrel.

A recent article by a Colonel Akimov in Starshina Serzhant, a Soviet magazine for noncommissioned officers, covers the latest developments in US small arms and provides some indication of Soviet intentions in this area. Akimov called particular attention to the capability of the Stoner system, a US development in which a single basic weapon performs as either a full or semi-automatic rifle or carbine or light machine gun. He also placed special emphasis on the development of lightweight ammunition and noted that the US was trying to develop a plastic bullet, suggesting that the Soviets might try to do the same. He was generally skeptical of the lethal power of a laser rifle, because of its slow rate of fire.

Thus, while it is certain that Soviet and other Communist weapons specialists are investigating all types of small arms, they are not likely to abandon the simple and effective present family of weapons in the near future.

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Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT 4 Feb 66

SOVIET SMALL ARMS




SHPAGIN Submachine gun (PPSh)

Date into use	1941
Weight; unloaded	7.7 lbs.
with loaded box	9.26 lbs.
with loaded drum	11.99 lbs.
Operating method	Blowback
Rate of fire	Full or semiautomatic; 100 rounds per minute
Feeding device	35 round box (as shown) 71 round box
Effective range	200 meters (219 yards)
Muzzle velocity	500 meters (1,650 feet) per sec
Overall length	0.842 meters (33.2 inches)
Ammunition	7.62mm M-1930 Pistol

Remarks:

Chinese version called K-50.

Modified Chinese K-50 submachine gun.
Note removeable metal stock, shortened crimped barrel, jacket,
and pistol grip.



SUDAYEV Submachine gun (PPS)

Date into use	1943
Weight; unloaded	6.61 lbs.
loaded	7.98 lbs.
Operating method	Blowback
Rate of fire	Automatic only; 100 rds per min
Feeding device	35 round box magazine
Effective range	200 meters (219 yards)
Muzzle velocity	500 meters (1,650 feet) per sec
Overall length	0.831 meters (32.7 inches)
Ammunition	7.62mm. M-1930 Pistol

Remarks:

With the stock folded the weapon is only 24.2 inches in length. The cyclic rate of the weapon has been retarded to permit touching off single rounds. Weapon is widely used in Far East.




SIMONOV Carbine (SKS)

Date into use	1949
Weight; unloaded	8.49 lbs.
loaded	8.84 lbs.
Operating method	Gas
Rate of fire	Semiautomatic; 35-40 rds per min
Feeding device	Box magazine, 10 rounds
Effective range	400 meters (440 yards)
Muzzle velocity	735 meters (2411 feet) per sec
Overall length	1.02 meters (40.2 inches)
(with bayonet folded)	
Ammunition	7.62mm. M-1943 short round

Remarks:

Bayonet is folding type, both needle (cruciform) and knife type, 9.5 inches long.



SOVIET SMALL ARMS

KALASHNIKOV Assault rifle (AK-47)




Date into use	1947
Weight; unloaded	9.48 lbs.
loaded	10.58 lbs.
Operating method	Gas
Rate of fire	Full or semiautomatic; 80-100 rounds per minute
Feeding device	30 round box magazine
Effective range	400 meters (438 yards)
Muzzle velocity	710 meters (2,329 feet) per sec
Overall length (without bayonet)	0.87 meters (34 inches)
Ammunition	7.62mm. M-1943 short round

Remarks:

All AK models can be equipped with folding metal stock. AK closely resembles the World War II German 7.92mm MP-44 "Sturmgewehr," which is still used in some East German paramilitary units. Czech M58 assault rifle is modeled on AK. AK bayonets now issued can serve as knife, saw or wire cutter. AK models are manufactured in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Finland, China, and North Korea.

AKM Assault rifle (Improved AK-47)



Operating parts of AKM assault rifle

Date into use	1949
Weight; unloaded (without magazine)	6.93 lbs.
loaded (with 30 rd magazine)	8.87 lbs.
Operating method	Gas
Rate of fire	Full or semiautomatic; 100 rounds per minute
Feeding device	30 round box magazine 40 rd RPK light machinegun box 70 rd RPK light machinegun drum
Effective range	400 meters (438 yards)
Muzzle velocity	710 meters (2,329 feet) per sec
Overall length (without bayonet)	0.87 meters (34 inches)
Ammunition	7.62mm. M-1943 short round

Remarks:

Unlike the AK-47, the AKM has a stamped receiver with bolt guides welded to inside walls, and an improved rear sight, graduated to 1000 meters. Also the handguard, fore-end, pistol grip and butt stock are of laminated wood. A Soviet journal published in October 1965 claimed that the loaded weight of the weapon (30 round magazine) is only 7.9 lbs., which if correct would be only a half pound heavier than the loaded weight of the US M16. The journal also claimed the bullet's effectiveness (uboy'naya sila) is maintained up to 1,500 meters.

SOVIET SMALL ARMS



Hungarian version of AK with forehand pistol grip.
Reportedly this is equipped with an infrared aiming device and has a plastic piston.

DEGTYAREV Light machine gun (RPD)

Date into use	1949
Weight: unloaded	14.5 lbs.
loaded	19.4 lbs.
(with drum magazine)	
Operating method	Gas
Rate of fire	150 rounds per minute
Feeding device	Automatic; 100 rd drum magazine
Effective range	800-1000 meters (875-1100 yards)
Muzzle velocity	735 meters (2411 feet) per sec
Overall length	1.04 meters (40.75 inches)
Ammunition	7.62mm. M-1943 short round

Remarks:

This weapon has a chromed barrel, as does the SKS, AK-47, AKM and RPK, but no quick-change barrel mechanism. It is therefore unsatisfactory for sustained fire. It was the standard light machine gun in the Soviet Army until 1961, but it continues to be widely used in most other Communist armies, including the Viet Cong.



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SOVIET SMALL ARMS



Soviet soldier of Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division using RPK light machine gun with 70-round drum magazine

KALASHNIKOV Light machine gun (RPK)

Date into use	1961
Weight;	
with empty box magazine	11.0 lbs.
with empty drum magazine	12.3 lbs.
Operating method	Gas
Rate of fire;	
single shot	50 rounds per minute
full automatic	130-150 rounds per minute
Feeding device	30 round AKM box magazine 40 round box magazine 70 round drum magazine
Effective range	800 meters (875 yards)
Muzzle velocity	745 meters (2444 feet) per sec

Remarks:


East German defectors report the RPK will completely replace the RPD in many East German units. Soviet airborne troops may soon be equipped with an RPK with a folding stock. Recent models of the RPK can fire at slow automatic as well as full automatic, thus conserving ammunition.

MOSIN-NAGANT Rifle 1891/30

Date into use	1891
Weight; unloaded	9.9 lbs.
loaded	11.2 lbs.
(with telescopic sight)	
Operating method	Turning bolt
Rate of fire;	
single shot	10 rounds per minute
Feeding device	Box magazine, 5 rounds
Effective range	400 meters (438 yards)
Muzzle velocity	865 meters (2838 feet) per sec
Overall length	1.23 meters (48.5 inches)
(without bayonet)	
Ammunition	7.62mm M-1908 rimmed

Remarks:

Still in service as a sniper's rifle. A shorter, lighter carbine version was issued in 1944. These two were standard weapons of the Soviet infantry at the end of World War II.




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U.S. AND SOVIET SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION

U.S.



US .30 caliber (7.62-mm.)
M-1 RIFLE



US .30 caliber (7.62-mm.)
M-1 & M-2 CARBINE



US 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber)
M-14 RIFLE



US 5.56-mm. (.223 caliber)
M-16 RIFLE



US .45 caliber (11-mm. M40)
.45 PISTOL, THOMPSON,
M-3 SUBMACHINE GUN

SOVIET



Soviet 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber M1908)
MOSIN-NAGANT RIFLE,
RP-46 COMPANY MACHINE GUN



Soviet 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber pistol)
K-50 (PPSh) & PPS



Soviet 7.62-mm. (.30 caliber M1943)
AK-47 (all versions), SKS, RPD, & RPK

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied